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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                      
 
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 
 Plaintiffs, Public Interest Research Group of New 
Jersey, Inc., (NJPIRG) and Friends of the Earth, Inc., (FOE) 
brought a citizen suit pursuant to the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act (Clean Water Act or Act), 86 Stat. 816, 33 U.S.C. § 
1251 et seq., against defendant Hercules, Inc.  Pursuant to the 
Act, plaintiffs notified Hercules, the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection and Energy (NJDEPE) that 
they intended to sue Hercules for alleged violations of its 
federal and state permits, limiting effluent discharge from its 
Gibbstown, New Jersey, facility.   
 Plaintiffs' notice letter claimed that Hercules 
committed sixty-eight discharge violations from April 1985 
through February 1989.  A discharge violation involves the 
release of a pollutant into receiving waters, which release 
exceeds the quantity, discharge rate, or concentration of the 
pollutant allowed by the permit.  In accord with the citizen suit 
provision of the Act, plaintiffs waited 60 days and then filed a 
  
complaint in federal district court, alleging that Hercules had 
violated its permit.  Plaintiffs attached to the complaint a list 
of eighty-seven discharge violations.  This list omitted several 
of the originally cited violations and included more than thirty 
new ones.  A majority of the new violations pre-dated the 60-day 
notice letter; the remainder post-dated it. 
 Between the time plaintiffs filed their complaint and 
moved for summary judgment, they supplemented the list of alleged 
permit violations, committed by Hercules, to include a total of 
114 discharge violations, 328 monitoring violations, 58 reporting 
violations, and 228 recordkeeping violations.  At no time prior 
to plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment did plaintiffs supply 
Hercules, EPA, or the State of New Jersey (State) with a new 
notice letter pursuant to the Act.  Hercules filed a cross-motion 
for summary judgment, seeking to dismiss all violations not 
listed in plaintiffs' notice letter.  The violations Hercules 
sought to dismiss included a majority of the discharge violations 
and all of the monitoring, reporting and recordkeeping 
violations. 
 The district court granted summary judgment for 
Hercules as to all pre-complaint discharge violations not listed 
in the notice letter and as to all monitoring, reporting and 
recordkeeping violations.  The court granted summary judgment for 
plaintiffs as to forty-three discharge violations listed in the 
notice letter and included in the complaint and as to seventeen 
  
post-complaint discharge violations of the same type as those 
included in the notice letter. 
 Both parties sought interlocutory review of the 
district court's decision to grant summary judgment on certain 
claims and to dismiss others; review was granted.  For the 
reasons stated below, we will affirm the decision of the district 
court in part, we will reverse it in part, and we will remand 
this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 I. 
 The Clean Water Act makes it unlawful to discharge any 
pollutant into the nation's waters except those discharges made 
in compliance with the Act.  33 U.S.C. § 1311.  In 1975, the 
federal government issued a National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES) permit to Hercules.  33 U.S.C. § 1342.  
This permit authorized Hercules to discharge certain pollutants 
from its Gibbstown facility into the Delaware River (outfall 001) 
and into Clonmell Creek (outfall 002) in strict compliance with 
conditions specified in the permit.  In addition to establishing 
limits on effluent discharges, the permit required Hercules to 
monitor its effluent and to submit reports of the results.  33 
U.S.C. § 1342(a)(2).  The Act requires that such reports, known 
as Discharge Monitoring Reports (DMRs), be made available to the 
public.  33 U.S.C. § 1318(b); 40 C.F.R. § 122.41 (j), (l). 
 The Clean Water Act allows each state to establish and 
administer its own permit program, provided that the program 
  
meets the requirements established under the Act and is approved 
by the EPA.  33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).  In 1982, the EPA authorized 
New Jersey to administer a state permit program.  After assuming 
this responsibility, NJDEPE issued a modified Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System permit to Hercules for the Gibbstown facility 
(NJPDES Permit No. NJ 0005134).  This permit established 
monitoring and reporting requirements similar to those of 
Hercules' NPDES permit.  40 C.F.R. § 123.25.  Under both federal 
and state law, Hercules was required to make its DMRs available 
to the public. 
 The NJPDES permit established the same two outfalls:  
outfall 001 into the Delaware River and outfall 002 into Clonmell 
Creek.  The permit established discharge limits and monitoring 
requirements for designated parameters at each outfall, with each 
parameter defined as a particular attribute of a discharge.  
Parameters under the Hercules permit included specific pollutants 
(such as fecal coliform) and discharge characteristics or water 
quality indicators (such as the color or pH value of the sample 
or the biochemical oxygen content).  The permit established 
strict limits on these parameters, both as to the overall amount 
of the pollutant and as to the concentration of the pollutant or 
water quality. 
   The Clean Water Act provides that federal or state 
authorities may take enforcement action against a permit holder 
who fails to comply with specified permit conditions.  33 U.S.C. 
  
§§ 1319 and 1342(b)(7).  In addition, the Act provides that 
private citizens may commence civil actions in certain situations 
against a permit holder who fails to comply with the Act.  33 
U.S.C. § 1365.  If the citizen prevails, the court may order 
injunctive relief and/or impose civil penalties which are payable 
to the United States.   
 Following a review of Hercules' DMRs on file with the 
federal government, NJPIRG notified Hercules, EPA, and the State 
of its intent to file suit under the citizen suit provision of 
the Act for Hercules' alleged violation of its permits.2  
Plaintiffs' March 21, 1989, notice letter listed sixty-eight 
discharges which plaintiffs claimed had occurred from April 1985 
through February 1989 in violation of Hercules' permits.3 
                     
    
2
 Plaintiff FOE joined in NJPIRG's March 21, 1989, notice 
letter on March 29, 1989. 
    
3
 Plaintiffs' letter, which was addressed to Hercules' plant 
manager, EPA and the State, stated as follows:    
   
   Section 505(b) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 
U.S.C. § 1365(b), requires that 60 days prior to the filing of a 
citizen suit in federal district court under section 505(a) of 
the Act, the alleged violator, the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, and the State in which the alleged violations occur must 
be given notice of the alleged violations.    
   
   The Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc., 84 
Paterson Street, New Brunswick, NJ 08901 [phone number] hereby 
places you on notice, pursuant to Section 505(b) of the Act, 33 
U.S.C. §1365(b), that it believes that your facility in 
Gibbstown, New Jersey, has violated and continues to violate "an 
effluent standard or limitation" under Section 505(a)(1)(A) of 
the Act, 33 U.S.C. §1365(a)(1)(A), by failing to comply with 
NPDES/NJPDES permit number NJ 0005134 in at least the instances 
  
 Plaintiffs' notice letter alleged that Hercules 
violated its permit for the parameters of biological oxygen 
demand, total residual chlorine, chemical oxygen demand, total 
suspended solids, phenol, fecal coliform, and bioassay at outfall 
001 and the parameters of pH, phenol, chemical oxygen demand, and 
total suspended solids at outfall 002.  The notice letter listed 
permit violations only in the discharge of a particular 
pollutant; it did not list any violations for the monitoring 
required to track that pollutant or for the reporting or 
recordkeeping which documented the monitoring.  It is the 
discharge violations, however, which are most easily 
                                                                  
enumerated in the attached chronological list of permit 
violations.   
 
   The attached list is based on available permit records on file 
at the offices of EPA Region 2 in New York City. In some 
instances, information was missing from the public files. We 
therefore expect to request information from your records to 
bridge these data gaps and to supplement the list of violations 
based on that information. However, we do not believe that it is 
necessary to provide you with additional notice concerning any 
supplemental violations before filing a judicial enforcement 
action.    
   
   We intend, at the close of the 60-day notice period or shortly 
thereafter, to file a citizen suit under Section 505(a) of the 
Act against your company for the violations at the Gibbstown 
facility.     
   During the 60-day notice period, we would be willing to 
discuss a settlement of the claims in this letter.  However, if 
you wish to pursue such negotiations in the absence of 
litigation, we suggest that you initiate those discussions within 
the next 10 days so that they may be completed before the end of 
the 60-day notice period. We do not intend to delay the filing of 
a complaint in federal court if discussions are continuing when 
that period ends. 
  
ascertainable from the information available to the public, i.e., 
the DMRs which Hercules must file. 
 Plaintiffs filed a citizen suit in federal district 
court on May 24, 1989, shortly after the 60-day notice period had 
expired.  The complaint alleged eighty-seven discharge violations 
which had occurred from April 1985 through March 1989.  Among 
these were more than thirty new violations which had not been 
included in the notice letter; a majority of the new violations 
pre-dated the notice letter, the remainder post-dated it.   
 Between the time of the 60-day notice letter on March 
21, 1989, and the plaintiffs' final submission for purposes of 
summary judgment on September 14, 1992, plaintiffs made numerous 
modifications of their list of alleged violations through 
"informal" amendments to their complaint.  Plaintiffs added 
discharge violations and for the first time alleged monitoring, 
reporting and recordkeeping violations.4  The majority of 
                     
    
4
 According to the record before us, plaintiffs provided the 
district court with the following documentation of violations:  
(1) 60-day notice letter, March 21, 1989 (listing 68 discharge 
violations); (2) Complaint filed with district court, May 24, 
1989 (listing 87 discharge violations and referencing three 
apparent monitoring violations); (3) Plaintiffs' second set of 
interrogatories, July 3, 1990 (listing 104 discharge violations); 
(4) Plaintiffs' response to second set of documents requests, 
January 15, 1991 (listing 110 discharge violations, 31 monitoring 
violations, 17 reporting violations); (5) Plaintiffs' brief in 
support of motion for summary judgment, February 15, 1991 
(listing 130 discharge violations, 406 monitoring violations, 12 
reporting violations); (6) Plaintiffs' reply brief in support of 
motion for summary judgment, May 30, 1991 (listing 120 discharge 
violations, 352 monitoring violations, 58 reporting violations); 
(7) Plaintiffs' letter to district court clarifying for court 
  
monitoring violations were instances when Hercules did not 
analyze samples before the time limit specified in the permit for 
holding samples had expired.  Reporting violations consisted of 
instances when Hercules erroneously reported the kind of sample 
that was taken or when Hercules failed to report a discharge 
violation.  Recordkeeping violations involved paperwork and 
clerical errors.  Plaintiffs' final submission to the district 
court alleged that Hercules had committed 114 discharge 
violations, 328 monitoring violations, 58 reporting violations, 
and 228 recordkeeping violations.5  Plaintiffs did not send a new 
60-day letter, giving notice of these additional violations, nor 
did plaintiffs formally amend their complaint to include them.6 
                                                                  
alleged violations for purposes of summary judgment, September 
14, 1992 (listing 114 discharge violations, 328 monitoring 
violations, 58 reporting violations, 228 recordkeeping 
violations). 
    
5
 Of the 114 discharge violations included in plaintiffs' 
final list, 61 were not included in the original notice.  A 
substantial majority of the newly listed violations, 57 of the 
61, involved the same parameter at the same outfall as the 
violations included in the notice letter but occurred on 
different dates.  Of the other four, one involved the same 
parameter (pH) but a different outfall, and the remaining three 
involved new parameters (color and total dissolved solids) (items 
48, 60, 79, and 112 on the plaintiffs' final list). 
    
6
 On April 7, 1993, subsequent to the district court's March 
31, 1993, ruling, plaintiffs filed a new 60-day notice letter 
citing the alleged monitoring, reporting and recordkeeping 
violations dismissed by the court.  On June 11, 1993, plaintiffs 
filed a new complaint in district court which included the 
violations listed in the new notice letter.  On July 2, 1993, 
plaintiffs filed another 60-day notice letter citing many of the 
discharge violations dismissed by the court.  This letter stated 
that at the end of 60 days, plaintiffs intended to file a motion 
  
 Following receipt of the plaintiffs' original 60-day 
notice letter, but prior to the district court's decision in this 
matter, Hercules received a Notice of Civil Penalty Assessment 
from the State for violations of its permit.  In March 1991, 
Hercules and the State executed an Administrative Consent Order 
(ACO) under which Hercules agreed to pay the State $600,000 as a 
penalty for 115 discharge violations of its permit which had 
occurred between March 1985 and August 1990.  All but two of the 
discharge violations addressed in the ACO were included among the 
discharge violations alleged by the plaintiffs in their final 
submission to the district court.  In other words, of the 115 
discharge violations which served as the basis for the imposition 
of the $600,000 penalty by the State, 113 were included in the 
plaintiffs' final submission to the district court.7 
 A. District Court Opinion 
 Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment as to 
liability and for permanent injunctive relief, enjoining Hercules 
from future violations of the Clean Water Act.  Hercules filed a 
                                                                  
with the district court to amend their original complaint to 
include these alleged discharge violations. 
    
7
 In addition to asserting in district court that plaintiffs' 
notice letter failed to comply with the law, Hercules argued that 
as a matter of equity the district court should not impose fines 
for those discharge violations which were the subject of the 
State penalty and, in the alternative, that as a matter of law 
the fine already paid by Hercules was an adequate remedy.  The 
district court rejected these arguments.  These questions are not 
included as a part of the interlocutory appeal and we will not 
address them. 
  
cross-motion for summary judgment, asserting that plaintiffs had 
failed to comply with the 60-day notice provision of the Act.   
 The district court examined the plaintiffs' 60-day 
notice letter and compared it to the final list of alleged 
violations submitted by plaintiffs.  Finding that the notice 
letter did not notify Hercules, the EPA, or the State of 
plaintiffs' intent to sue for monitoring, reporting and 
recordkeeping violations, the district court granted summary 
judgment for Hercules on all of these violations.  830 F. Supp. 
1525, 1534 (D.N.J. 1993) ("In sum, there has never been a 
statutory notice letter in this case that alleged a specific 
monitoring, reporting, or recordkeeping violation, so all of the 
alleged monitoring, reporting, and recordkeeping violations must 
be dismissed.").   
 The district court then placed the discharge violations 
into three categories:  (1) discharge violations included in both 
the notice letter and the final list; (2) pre-complaint discharge 
violations not included in the notice letter but included in the 
final list; and (3) post-complaint discharge violations included 
in the final list.8  Finding that plaintiffs had complied with 
the Act's notice requirement for the violations in category one, 
the district court denied Hercules' summary judgment motion 
                     
    
8
 Of the 114 alleged discharge violations, 53 were in 
category one, 44 were in category two, and 17 were in category 
three. 
  
regarding them.  As for the violations in category two, the court 
granted Hercules' summary judgment motion, holding that 
plaintiffs had failed to comply with the Act's notice 
requirement.  Id. at 1534 ("those violations which in fact 
occurred before the complaint was filed on May 24, 1989 cannot be 
sued upon unless first noticed in compliance with 33 U.S.C. § 
1365 and the accompanying regulations codified at 40 C.F.R. § 
135.3").  With regard to category three, the court found no 
statutory requirement that defendants first be notified by 
plaintiffs of their intent to sue.  It, therefore, granted 
summary judgment for plaintiffs on these violations. 
 In support of its decision to distinguish between 
category two violations and category three violations, the 
district court, citing Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake 
Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987), wrote that:  
"[S]ubsequently occurring violations not noticed in a citizen's 
60-day notice letter were specifically contemplated -- indeed 
required -- by the Supreme Court as a prerequisite to a district 
court's jurisdiction over a citizen suit under the Clean Water 
Act."  830 F. Supp. at 1534.  The court held that such post-
complaint violations, being "the 'type of activity' (e.g., 
discharging pollutants in excess of permit limitations) as have 
been alleged in the notice letter[,]" survived defendant's 
summary judgment motion.  Id.  After reviewing the evidence on 
violations in categories one and three, a total of 70 violations, 
  
the court granted summary judgment (with respect to liability 
only) in favor of plaintiffs on 60 of these.9 
 In sum, the district court held that, under the Act's 
notice requirement, the plaintiffs could sue only for those 
discharge violations that were included in their notice letter or 
that occurred after the complaint was filed and were a 
continuation of the same type of violation as contained in the 
notice letter.  The only issue remaining for trial would then be 
a determination of the size of the penalty for the established 
discharge violations. 
 B. District Court Order on Interlocutory Appeal 
 Following the district court's order granting in part 
and denying in part the parties' motions for summary judgment, 
plaintiffs sought entry of final judgment under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 
54(b) as to those claims dismissed by the court.  830 F. Supp. 
1549, 1553 (D.N.J. 1993).  In the alternative, plaintiffs sought 
                     
    
9
 Of the total 114 discharge violations:  Summary judgment 
was granted in favor of plaintiffs on 60; 44 were dismissed on 
the basis that no notice was provided by plaintiff; four were 
dismissed on the basis that Hercules had established an "upset" 
defense; and six were left for later judgment.  Subsequent to the 
district court's ruling, the parties entered into a stipulation 
which permanently disposed of the latter 10 discharge violations.  
830 F. Supp. 1549, 1552 n.4.   
 Of the 60 violations on which summary judgment was 
granted for plaintiffs, 43 were included in the 60-day notice 
letter, and 17 occurred after the complaint was filed.  Of the 44 
violations that were dismissed due to lack of notice, 23 occurred 
before the 60-day notice letter was filed, and 21 occurred after 
the notice was filed. 
  
certification, for purposes of an interlocutory appeal, of the 
court's interpretation of the Act's 60-day notice requirement.  
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (establishing a district court's authority to 
certify a controlling question of law for interlocutory appeal).  
 Defendants filed a cross-motion, seeking certification 
under § 1292(b) on the question of whether the district court 
erred in failing to dismiss the post-complaint discharge 
violations.  After considering and rejecting plaintiffs' motion 
for final judgment as to the dismissed violations, the court 
granted plaintiffs' motion and defendant's cross-motion for 
certification of a question of law for interlocutory appeal.  The 
court certified the question of law as: 
 
 Whether this court correctly decided, 
pursuant to section 505(b)(1) of the Clean 
Water Act, as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1) 
and the accompanying regulations at 40 C.F.R. 
§ 135.3, that where plaintiffs have given 
notice of intent to sue for various discharge 
violations but no other type of violation 
(i.e., monitoring, reporting or 
recordkeeping) this court's subject matter 
jurisdiction includes the noticed violations 
and any post-complaint continuing violations 
of the same type as those for which notice 
was given, but not unnoticed pre-complaint 
violations, nor post-complaint violations of 
a different type from those for which notice 
was given. 
Id. at 1560.     
 II. 
  
  
 The district court had jurisdiction over this citizen 
suit pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1365.  Following the district 
court's order certifying a question of law for interlocutory 
appeal, we granted both parties permission to appeal pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  Our review is limited to the question of 
law raised in the district court's order, Dailey v. National 
Hockey League, 987 F.2d 172, 175 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. 
Ct. 67 (1993), and our review is plenary.  Louis W. Epstein 
Family Partnership v. KMart Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 766 (3d Cir. 
1994). 
 III. 
 The Clean Water Act authorizes a citizen (defined as a 
person or persons having an interest which is or may be adversely 
affected) to bring suit in federal court against any person who 
is alleged to be in violation of "an effluent standard or 
limitation" as defined in the Act or "an order issued by the 
[EPA] Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or 
limitation."  33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1).  In order to commence a 
suit, a citizen must comply with § 1365(b), which states in part: 
 No action may be commenced - 
 
  (1) under subsection (a)(1) of this 
section - 
 
       (A) prior to sixty days after 
the plaintiff has given notice of 
the alleged violation (i) to the 
Administrator, (ii) to the State in 
which the alleged violation occurs, 
and (iii) to any alleged violator 
  
of the standard, limitation, or 
order. 
33 U.S.C. § 1365(b). 
 In crafting the citizen suit provision, Congress sought 
to "strike a balance between encouraging citizen enforcement of 
environmental regulations and avoiding burdening the federal 
courts with excessive numbers of citizen suits."  Hallstrom v. 
Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 29 (1989) (analyzing the 
legislative history of the citizen suit provision of the Clean 
Air Amendments of 1970, which served as the precursor to 
analogous citizen suit provisions in the Clean Water Act and the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976).  The Supreme 
Court stated in Hallstrom: 
 Requiring citizens to comply with the notice 
and delay requirements serves this 
congressional goal in two ways.  First, 
notice allows Government agencies to take 
responsibility for enforcing environmental 
regulations, thus obviating the need for 
citizen suits.  See Gwaltney of Smithfield, 
Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 
U.S. 49, 60 (1987) ("The bar on citizen suits 
when governmental enforcement action is under 
way suggests that the citizen suit is meant 
to supplement rather than to supplant 
governmental action").  In many cases, an 
agency may be able to compel compliance 
through administrative action, thus 
eliminating the need for any access to the 
courts.  Second, notice gives the alleged 
violator "an opportunity to bring itself into 
complete compliance with the Act and thus 
likewise render unnecessary a citizen suit."  
Gwaltney, supra, at 60. 
  
Id. (citation omitted).  Either of these resolutions, as cited in 
Hallstrom, whether by agency action compelling compliance or by 
self-compliance on the part of the violator, will halt the 
discharge of the pollutant -- the ultimate purpose of the Act.  
If the violation continues, however, the citizen suit will be the 
vehicle to achieve compliance. 
 With that purpose in mind for citizen suits, Congress 
then delegated to the EPA the task of determining the form of the 
notice letter.  Subsection 1365(b) provides that "[n]otice under 
this subsection shall be given in such manner as the [EPA] 
Administrator shall prescribe by regulation."  The legislative 
history indicates that Congress sought here to strike a balance 
between providing notice recipients with sufficient information 
to identify the basis of the citizen's claim and not placing an 
undue burden on the citizen.    
 [S]uch regulations should reflect simplicity, 
clarity, and standardized form.  The 
regulations should not require notice that 
places impossible or unnecessary burdens on 
citizens but rather should be confined to 
requiring information necessary to give a 
clear indication of the citizens' intent.  
These regulations might require information 
regarding the identity and location of the 
alleged polluter, a brief description of the 
activity alleged to be in violation, and the 
provision of law alleged to be violated. 
  
S. Rep. No. 92-414 at 80 (1971), 92d Cong. 1st Sess., reprinted 
in 2 Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments of 1972 at 1498 (1973) (hereinafter Leg. Hist.).10 
 Pursuant to the statutory directions, EPA drafted a 
regulation, 40 C.F.R. § 135.3(a), which prescribed the contents 
of a notice letter: 
 
 Violation of standard, limitation or order.  
Notice regarding an alleged violation of an 
effluent standard or limitation or of an 
order with respect thereto, shall include 
sufficient information to permit the 
recipient to identify the specific standard, 
limitation, or order alleged to have been 
violated, the activity alleged to constitute 
a violation, the person or persons 
responsible for the alleged violation, the 
location of the alleged violation, the date 
or dates of such violation, and the full 
name, address, and telephone number of the 
person giving notice. 
                     
    
10
 The House Report accompanying the Clean Water Act 
amendments noted that the regulations promulgated by the EPA 
Administrator: 
 
 should be issued as soon as possible after 
enactment of this legislation and, although 
not placing unnecessary or impossible burdens 
on complainants, should require information 
regarding the identity and location of the 
alleged polluter, a brief description of the 
activity alleged to be in violation, [and] 
the provision of law alleged to be violated. 
 
H. R. Rep. No. 92-911 at 133 (1972), 92d Cong. 2d Sess., 
reprinted in 1 Leg. Hist. at 820. 
  
 In the present dispute, Hercules does not contend that 
plaintiffs failed to send a 60-day notice letter.  Rather, 
Hercules asserts that plaintiffs' 60-day notice letter lacked the 
specificity, required by the Act and its regulation, to put the 
recipients of the letter on notice of the violations upon which 
plaintiffs intended to sue.  The district court agreed, holding 
that plaintiffs' 60-day notice letter failed to satisfy the "more 
specific, detailed requirements" of the regulation.  830 F. Supp. 
at 1532.  In making this assessment, the court stated, in the 
words of the regulation, that except for the sixty-eight 
discharge violations, plaintiffs' 
 notice letter fails to "identify the specific 
standard, limitation or order alleged to have 
been violated" -- which means the permit 
requirement which has been violated.  The 
notice letter fails to identify "the activity 
alleged to constitute a violation" -- such as 
failure to test or report or keep adequate 
records, for example.  The notice letter was 
also deficient as to unlisted violations by 
not giving the "date or dates of such 
violation," all as required in 40 C.F.R. § 
135.3(a).  Each of these provisions is a 
component of statutory "notice of the alleged 
violation" as a prerequisite to suit under § 
[1365](b)(1) of the Act. 
 
Id.  The district court went on to find that the notice letter 
was also deficient under the language of the statute: 
 
  That each of the violations alleged in 
the Complaint must have been stated in the 
sixty-day notice letter likewise is compelled 
by the statute's plain language, because § 
[1365(b)(1)] requires not just notice of an 
  
alleged violation, but "notice of the 
violation." (Emphasis added.)  Congress could 
not have chosen clearer language to express 
the requirement that the Complaint will be 
limited to the violations listed in the 
sixty-day notice letter. 
Id.  
 We disagree with the district court's reading of both 
the statute and the regulation.  Under the district court's 
construction, the burden is placed on the citizen to identify not 
only the specific standard, limitation, or order alleged to have 
been violated but also the "activity," i.e., any aspect of 
tracking and recording a pollutant discharge that may constitute 
a violation.  The district court also placed the burden on the 
citizen to identify every pre-complaint date on which there was 
an excess discharge of a designated pollutant.    
 While there is no doubt that such detailed information 
is helpful to the recipient of a notice letter in identifying the 
basis for the citizen suit, such specificity is not mandated by 
the regulation.  The regulation does not require that the citizen 
identify every detail of a violation.  Rather, it states that 
"[n]otice regarding an alleged violation . . . shall include 
sufficient information to permit the recipient to identify" the 
components of an alleged violation.  40 C.F.R. § 135.3(a) 
(emphasis added).   
 We read the regulation to require just what it says:  
that the citizen provide enough information to enable the 
  
recipient, i.e., Hercules, EPA and/or the State, to identify the 
specific effluent discharge limitation which has been violated, 
including the parameter violated, the date of the violation, the 
outfall at which it occurred, and the person or persons involved.  
 In this regard, because a permit violation occurs 
through an excess discharge of a pollutant into the water and 
because compliance with a permit limitation is tracked through 
monitoring, reporting and recordkeeping, we conclude that a 
monitoring, reporting and recordkeeping violation, which is an 
aspect of the permit requirement involved in a noticed discharge 
violation, should be an element of that same overall episode.  
Once the discharge violation is noticed, any subsequently 
discovered monitoring, reporting or recordkeeping violation that 
is directly related to the discharge violation may be included in 
the citizen suit.  
 A general notice letter that fails sufficiently to 
inform its recipients of the violations upon which a citizen 
intends to bring suit will not conform to the Act's requirement.  
However, the citizen is not required to list every specific 
aspect or detail of every alleged violation.  Nor is the citizen 
required to describe every ramification of a violation.  If an 
excessive discharge is noticed and it is later discovered that 
monitoring for that parameter at that outfall on that day was 
also faulty, we conclude, pursuant to the language of the 
regulation, that sufficient notice has been given of the 
  
monitoring violation to include it in the suit.  Similarly, if a 
violation of monitoring for a specific parameter is noticed and 
it is later discovered that a discharge violation of that 
parameter also occurred at that outfall on that day, we find that 
sufficient notice has been given of the discharge violation to 
include it in the suit.  We come to this determination because, 
in investigating one aspect of a parameter violation, such as a 
discharge, the other aspects of that violation, for instance 
monitoring, reporting, and recordkeeping requirements for that 
parameter, will of necessity come under scrutiny.  We find that 
notice of one facet of an effluent infraction is sufficient to 
permit the recipient of the notice to identify other violations 
arising from the same episode.   
 Moreover, unlike the district court, we do not read § 
1365 to compel a finding that a citizen must give notice to 
recipients of each individual violation of a specific discharge 
limitation.  For example, if a permit holder has discharged 
pollutant "x" in excess of the permitted effluent limit five 
times in a month but the citizen has learned only of four 
violations, the citizen will give notice of the four violations 
of which the citizen then has knowledge but should be able to 
include the fifth violation in the suit when it is discovered.  
Whether the agency or the permit holder is informed of four or 
five excess discharges of pollutant "x" will probably make no 
difference in a decision to bring about compliance.  If the 
  
agency or the permit holder decides, however, not to comply, 
there seems to be nothing gained by requiring the citizen to file 
a new notice letter in order to include a fifth violation in the 
suit.  A literal reading of the statute requires that the citizen 
identify discharges in excess of the effluent limit, but not 
necessarily each individual excess.  
 Hercules contends, however, that notice of each 
individual violation is necessary in order for the recipients of 
the notice to evaluate the extent of the citizen's claim.  
Hercules suggests, for example, that whereas the EPA or the State 
might not pursue an enforcement action against an alleged 
violator with a small number of individual violations, the 
government would be more likely to act if each individual 
violation were included in the notice.  Similarly, the larger the 
number of cited violations, the greater incentive for the permit 
holder to try to comply. 
 Hercules' argument ignores the fact that both the 
federal and state government enforcement agencies have access to 
the DMRs.  Both the Clean Water Act and the New Jersey permit 
program require that a permittee file DMRs with the EPA and the 
NJDEPE.  The DMRs filed by Hercules list the discharge 
violations.  Once a notice letter from a citizen has been 
received, the EPA and the State can, with relative ease, check 
for other discharge violations of the same type.  Moreover, as 
the author of the DMRs, Hercules is surely on notice of the 
  
contents of the reports and of the frequency of similar 
violations.  
 The district court and Hercules also place great 
reliance on Hallstrom for their interpretation of the statute and 
regulation.  The Supreme Court held in Hallstrom that "the notice 
and 60-day delay requirements are mandatory conditions precedent 
to commencing suit under the RCRA [Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act of 1976] citizen suit provision; a district court 
may not disregard these requirements at its discretion."  493 
U.S. at 31.  Hercules and the district court would have us read 
Hallstrom broadly, extending the Supreme Court's interpretation 
of the notice and 60-day delay requirements to a ruling on the 
contents of a notice. 
 We decline to apply Hallstrom so broadly.  The Supreme 
Court's focus in Hallstrom was on the timing of the notice, not 
on its contents.  First, while the literal reading of the statute 
clearly compels the Court's interpretation of the 60-day delay 
requirement, there is no express requirement in the statute 
pertaining to the content of a notice letter.  In fact, as we 
have noted, Congress delegated to the EPA the authority to 
determine the necessary contents of a notice letter.    
 Second, the Court in Hallstrom saw no need even to 
refer to the regulation.  The dispute there involved whether 
notice and delay were preconditions to suit, not whether the 
extent of the notice was adequate.  See also Dague v. City of 
  
Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1352 (2d Cir. 1991) ("the city argues 
that the plaintiffs' notice did not comply with the content 
requirements of the statutory and regulatory notice provisions, 
thus mandating dismissal under Hallstrom.  In the first place, 
Hallstrom did not address such technical criteria"), rev'd, in 
part, on other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992).   
 This conclusion does not mean, however, that Hallstrom 
is not helpful in our analysis of the notice requirement.  In 
deciding whether the plaintiffs here complied with the content 
requirements established under the regulation, we must consider 
whether their notice letter served the purpose that Congress 
intended:  To provide the recipient with effective, as well as 
timely, notice.  Hallstrom's analysis of Congress' intent in 
crafting the citizen suit provision, see supra page     
[typescript 17-18], makes clear that not only is the 60-day 
notice before filing suit "a mandatory, not optional, condition 
precedent for suit," 493 U.S. at 26, but also that the content of 
the notice must be adequate for the recipients of the notice to 
identify the basis for the citizen's complaint.   
 The ultimate goal of a citizen suit is to bring the 
alleged violator into compliance with the nation's environmental 
laws.  This can be achieved through citizen enforcement efforts, 
government enforcement efforts, or self-enforcement efforts.  In 
this regard, the Senate Report noted:  "[t]he Committee intends  
the great volume of enforcement actions be brought by the State 
  
[rather than the federal government]. . . . It should be noted 
that if the Federal, State, and local agencies fail to exercise 
their enforcement responsibility, the public is provided the 
right to seek vigorous enforcement action under the citizen suit 
provisions."  S. Rep. No. 92-414 at 64, 2 Leg. Hist. at 1482.   
 Moreover, we note the Supreme Court's statement in 
Gwaltney that "[t]he bar on citizen suits when governmental 
enforcement action is under way suggests that the citizen suit is 
meant to supplement rather than to supplant governmental action."  
484 U.S. at 60.  In deciding whether to initiate an enforcement 
action, the EPA and the state must be provided with enough 
information to enable them intelligently to decide whether to do 
so.  At the same time, the alleged violator must be provided with 
enough information to be able to bring itself into compliance.  
We will judge the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' 60-day notice 
letter in terms of whether it accomplishes these purposes. 
   IV. 
 Applying these legal precepts to the present dispute, 
we will analyze the violations in following order:  (A) pre-
complaint discharge violations, (B) post-complaint discharge 
violations, and (C) monitoring, reporting and recordkeeping 
violations.11 
                     
    
11
 The district court's certification for this interlocutory 
appeal did not request review of its decision to grant summary 
judgment for plaintiffs as to those discharge violations included 
in the both the notice letter and plaintiffs' final list.  We  
  
 A. Pre-Complaint Discharge Violations 
 The district court held that pre-complaint discharge 
violations not included in plaintiffs' notice letter cannot be 
included in the suit unless listed in a subsequent notice.  For 
this reason, the district court granted defendant's summary 
judgment motion as to forty-four pre-complaint discharge 
violations.12  We do not agree.   
 For the reasons stated in Part III, supra, we hold that 
a notice letter which includes a list of discharge violations, by 
parameter, provides sufficient information for the recipients of 
the notice to identify violations of the same type (same 
parameter, same outfall) occurring during and after the period 
covered by the notice letter.  
 The facts of this dispute support this holding.  Less 
than two months after receiving the plaintiffs' 60-day notice 
letter, the State filed a Notice of Civil Penalty Assessment 
against Hercules for discharge violations of the permit.  
Although many of the sixty individual violations included in the 
State's initial list were exactly the same violation as included 
in the plaintiff's 60-day notice letter, there were several that 
were not on the plaintiffs' list.  Some of these additional 
                                                                  
do not therefore address this aspect of the district court's 
opinion. 
    
12
 This includes 23 pre-notice discharge violations and 21 
post-notice discharge violations. 
  
violations occurred in months during which plaintiffs did not 
identify any discharge violation.  We infer from this comparison 
that the State examined Hercules' DMRs on file to achieve a more 
comprehensive list of discharge violations.  Almost two years 
later, in March 1991, Hercules and the State executed an ACO 
under which Hercules agreed to pay the State $600,000 as a 
penalty for 115 discharge violations of its permit.  The fact 
that the State's list of Hercules' discharge violations grew from 
60 to 115 in the final ACO demonstrates that once the State 
received the citizen letter noting that Hercules was violating 
its permit, the State committed resources to monitoring Hercules' 
compliance and, in particular, to monitoring Hercules' compliance 
with the noticed parameters. 
 We hold, therefore, that the district court erred in 
granting Hercules' summary judgment motion as to the forty-four 
pre-complaint discharge violations not included in plaintiffs' 
notice letter.  We will remand this case to the district court to 
reinstate those alleged violations which are of the same type 
(same parameter, same outfall) as the alleged violations included 
in the plaintiffs' 60-day notice letter.13        
 B. Post-Complaint Discharge Violations 
                     
    
13The district court did not indicate why it grouped post-
notice/pre-complaint violations with the pre-notice violations 
rather than with the post-complaint violations.  Under the rule 
we establish here, however, that distinction is not significant. 
  
 Finding that the post-complaint discharge violations 
included in the plaintiffs' list were a continuation of the type 
of activity alleged in the notice letter and finding no legal 
requirement that Hercules first be notified by plaintiffs of 
their intention to sue upon these violations, the district court 
held that these violations survived defendant's summary judgment 
motion.  
 For the most part, we agree with the district court.  
We hold that as long as a post-complaint discharge violation is 
of the same type as a violation included in the notice letter 
(same parameter, same outfall), no new 60-day notice letter is 
necessary to include these violations in the suit.  In so 
holding, we do not in effect distinguish between pre-complaint 
violations and post-complaint violations.   
 Hercules disagrees, arguing that recipients of the 
notice letter may be more likely to act (i.e., the government may 
initiate enforcement action; the permit holder may attempt to 
remedy the violation) if a citizen is required to file a new 
notice for post-complaint violations.  While it is true that the 
recipients may be more likely to take action as the number of 
violations increases, we do not find that this justifies a 
requirement that a new notice must be given for post-complaint 
violations before commencing a suit which will include these 
violations.   
  
 Rather, we find that the recipients of the notice are 
already on notice of violations of the same type, whether past or 
continuing.  As recipients of the permittee's DMRs, the federal 
and state enforcement agencies have the ability to review the 
permittee's compliance.  The federal and state enforcement 
agencies are on notice of continuing or intermittent violations 
of the same type because they are reported to them in the DMRs.  
Likewise, the permit holder is on notice of continuing or 
intermittent violations, given the fact that the permit holder is 
responsible for filing the DMRs. 
 The district court denied Hercules' summary judgment 
motion as to all seventeen post-complaint discharge violations.  
A review of these seventeen discharge violations reveals that all 
but one involved the same type of violations as those noticed in 
plaintiffs' 60-day notice letter.  In other words, sixteen of the 
seventeen post-complaint discharge violations involved the same 
parameter and the same outfall as discharge violations included 
in the notice letter.  We will affirm the district court's 
decision as to these sixteen post-complaint discharge violations.  
As for the seventeenth violation, item 112 on plaintiffs' final 
list, involving the parameter of total dissolved solids, we will 
remand this violation to the district court for a determination 
whether, under the standard outlined above, this violation was 
sufficiently related to the noticed violations for Hercules to be 
able to  identify it from the notice letter.  
  
 We have found implicit support for this conclusion 
regarding post-complaint violations in the Supreme Court's 
decision in Gwaltney.  There, the Court held that federal courts 
do not have jurisdiction over a citizen suit for "wholly past 
violations."  484 U.S. at 64.  Rather, jurisdiction exists "when 
the citizen-plaintiffs make a good-faith allegation of continuous 
or intermittent violation."  Id.  In reaching this decision, the 
Supreme Court noted that "the harm sought to be addressed by the 
citizen suit lies in the present or the future, not in the past."  
Id. at 59. 
 Gwaltney requires that for jurisdiction to attach, a 
citizen must make a good-faith allegation of a continuous or 
intermittent violation by the defendant at the time the complaint 
is filed.  Because a citizen must delay filing suit for at least 
60 days after notice has been sent, it is foreseeable that a 
complaint will include allegations of more recent violations in 
an effort to establish "continuous or intermittent violations." 
 We recognize that the 60-day notice provision in the 
Act and the holding in Gwaltney represent "two separate 
jurisdictional requirements for bringing a citizen suit."  United 
States' Br. as Amicus Curiae at 17.  The Act requires that 
citizens provide a 60-day notice of intent to file suit.  
Gwaltney requires that a citizen's complaint contain a good-faith 
allegation of continuous or intermittent violation.  The dispute 
here involves the first jurisdictional prerequisite -- the 
  
adequacy of the notice letter.  Nevertheless, the basis for the 
Supreme Court's decision in Gwaltney is helpful to our analysis.  
Continuing or intermittent violations of the same type are 
necessary to create jurisdiction of the citizen suit.  They are 
perforce related to the noticed violations.  For this reason, 
they should be easily identifiable by the notice recipient and, 
therefore, do not need to be noticed in a new 60-day letter. 
 C. Monitoring, Reporting and Recordkeeping Violations 
 Finding that the plaintiffs' 60-day notice letter did 
not notify Hercules, EPA, or the State of plaintiffs' intent to 
sue for alleged monitoring, reporting or recordkeeping 
violations, the district court granted Hercules' motion for 
summary judgment as to all of these alleged violations.  We will 
reverse this holding.  As we set out in Part III, supra, we 
conclude that, when a parameter violation has been noticed, 
subsequently discovered, directly related violations of discharge 
limitations or of monitoring, reporting, and recordkeeping 
requirements for that same parameter at that outfall for that 
same period may be included in the citizen suit.  
 Monitoring, reporting and recordkeeping requirements 
are conditions of a permit.  When plaintiffs noticed the 
discharge violations, an investigation by Hercules, EPA, or the 
State of those excess discharges should uncover related 
  
violations of monitoring, reporting or recordkeeping involved in 
tracking those pollutant parameters.14 
 Support for our conclusion can be found in the 
legislative history of the citizen suit provision which makes 
clear that notice serves the important functions of allowing 
government agencies to take responsibility for enforcing 
environmental regulations and giving the alleged violator an 
opportunity to bring itself into complete compliance.  The 
concept of "complete compliance" should consist of the cessation 
                     
    
14The close interrelationship of monitoring, reporting, and 
recordkeeping with discharge limitations has been also been noted 
by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Sierra Club v. 
Simkins Industry, Inc., 847 F.2d 1109, 1115 (4th Cir. 1988), 
cert. denied, 491 U.S. 904 (1992): 
 
 [Defendant] was bound by the reporting and 
records retention requirements of the NPDES 
permit that are central to adequate 
administration and enforcement of limits on 
substantive discharges under the Clean Water 
Act.  Unless a permit holder monitors as 
required by the permit, it will be difficult 
if not impossible for state and federal 
officials charged with enforcement of the 
Clean Water Act to know whether or not the 
permit holder is discharging effluents in 
excess of the permit's maximum levels. 
  
of the offending discharge, with on-going discharges being 
monitored and recorded in accordance with the permit provisions.  
All these functions interact to ensure the permit holder's 
compliance with the permit conditions.  The proper performance of 
each function is required under the permit provisions and a 
violation of any one may subject the permit holder to a penalty. 
 The burden on the citizen, however, is to provide 
sufficient information of a violation, such as an excessive 
discharge, so that the permit holder and the agency can identify 
it.  If investigation of that discharge by the agency or the 
permit holder uncovers directly related monitoring, reporting, or 
recordkeeping violations, "complete compliance" should 
incorporate the correction of all such interconnected violations.  
If the agency or the permit holder fails to achieve "complete 
compliance," the citizen should be able in the citizen suit to 
seek "complete compliance," eliminating all directly related 
violations, without the burden of further notice.  Correction of 
an excessive discharge without correction of faulty monitoring of 
that parameter is not complete compliance.  Correction of faulty 
monitoring without correction of incomplete reporting of that 
parameter is not complete compliance.   
 If, however, we were to interpret the Act in the manner 
proposed by Hercules, with each of these functions, monitoring, 
reporting, and recordkeeping, being subject to separate notice 
prior to that violation being included in a suit, we might find 
  
the permit holder claiming "complete compliance" when only one 
aspect of these interrelated violations had been corrected.  We 
conclude that this latter result is not what Congress intended by 
"complete compliance." 
 We will reverse the district court's grant of summary 
judgment to Hercules on the monitoring, reporting, and 
recordkeeping violations, and we will remand that portion of the 
case to the district court to determine which of these violations 
are directly related to the discharge violations in suit and 
which are not.  Those that are not directly related should be 
dismissed unless, in the interim, plaintiffs move to amend their 
complaint to include them in this action or move to consolidate 
this action with the subsequent action plaintiffs filed on June 
11, 1993.15  
 
 V. 
 In sum, we will reverse the district court's decision 
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction the forty-four pre-complaint 
discharge violations.  On remand, the district court should 
reinstate those discharge violations which are of the same type 
                     
    
15As we note in footnote 6, on April 7, 1993, plaintiffs 
filed a new 60-day letter, citing the monitoring, reporting, and 
recordkeeping violations and filed a new complaint including 
them.  Thus, no further notice need be given by plaintiffs before 
amending their original complaint to incorporate any of these 
violations -- or, if they prefer, moving to consolidate the two 
complaints. 
  
(same parameter, same outfall, same time period) as the discharge 
violations included in the plaintiffs' 60-day notice letter.  We 
will affirm the district court's decision to deny defendant's 
summary judgment motion as to those post-complaint discharge 
violations involving the same parameter and same outfall as the 
discharge violations included in the notice letter.  Lastly, we 
will reverse the district court's decision to dismiss the 
monitoring, reporting and recordkeeping violations and remand 
consideration of these violations to the district court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
